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ABSTRACT. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) derive entry
thresholds for local markets but do not investigate actual entry
and exit ﬂows. This paper investigates for thirteen Belgian retail
and consumer service industries whether markets with actual
numbers of ﬁrms higher (lower) than the thresholds display exit
(entry) in subsequent periods. The results conﬁrm that over a
three-year period the rate of (net) entry is positively aﬀected by
the presence of ‘market room’. The exit rate, however, does not
show a negative relation with ‘market room’.




Local markets are a key characterization of
many service industries like plumbers, dentists,
shoe stores, ﬂower shops or restaurants. The
(equilibrium) number of ﬁrms in these local
service markets will be primarily dependent
upon local demand. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991), in an oft-cited article, derive and esti-
mate their so-called entry threshold, a measure
of the market size required to support a given
number of ﬁrms. The entry threshold is a zero-
proﬁt equilibrium level of demand (see also
Schmalensee, 1992 and Sutton, 1991), which can
be estimated using ordered probit analysis.
Although the title of their article ‘‘Entry and
Competition in Concentrated Markets’’ would
suggest diﬀerently, their article does not con-
sider actual entry into markets, nor exit. There
have been other papers using the Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) methodology, like Asplund and
Sandin (1999) and Dranove et al. (1992), but
they also did not include actual entry or exit.
The current paper investigates whether mar-
kets that have less ﬁrms than the entry threshold
show (net) entry of ﬁrms in the subsequent
period and whether markets that have more
ﬁrms than this threshold show (net) exit of ﬁrms.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) remark that more
complete data on entry and exit (in local mar-
kets) is required to investigate the timing of
entry and exit decisions. This is important to
progress from an essentially static cross-sec-
tional framework as developed by Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991) towards a dynamic framework
of entry and exit adjusting for market disequi-
libria. We have compiled a dataset for a range of
carefully selected service industries in the 455
local regions (municipalities) of Belgium with
less than 20,000 inhabitants. These data include
number of ﬁrms, entry, exit and factors deter-
mining market size.
The empirical investigation of the determi-
nants of entry and exit of ﬁrms in industries
started with the article by Mansﬁeld (1962). The
empirical framework proposed by Orr (1974) has
been quite inﬂuential in this ﬁeld of research.
Many empirical studies have since investigated
to what extent entry and exit of ﬁrms can be
explained from proﬁtability, market growth and
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DOI 10.1007/s11187-006-6860-9barriers to entry and exit. See Siegfried and
Evans (1994) and Carree (2006) for a review of
this literature. Carree and Thurik (1996) show
that the majority of empirical studies ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant and positive eﬀect of market growth and
of proﬁtability on both gross entry and net entry
rates. That is, entrepreneurs appear to be at-
tracted to proﬁtable growing markets, while they
tend to avoid saturated markets that are on the
decline. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Carree
and Thurik (1999) derive that in an oligopoly a
doublingof market demandless thandoubles the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms. Hause and DuRi-
etz (1984), however, suggest that there may be a
convex eﬀect of market growth: a doubling of the
growth rate leads to a more than doubling of the
entry rate. The issue of regional variation in en-
try and exit rates is subject of a diﬀerent, related,
literature (see e.g. the special issue of Regional
Studies in 1994). There has been quite some
attention for the ‘unemployment push’ hypoth-
esis tested by whether regions with high unem-
ployment rates have high subsequent (net) entry
rates (e.g. Carree, 2002). The emphasis in that
literature is shifting away from unemployment
concerns towards agglomeration eﬀects and
high-tech start-ups (Armington and Acs, 2002).
In this study we focus upon industries with
relatively low barriers to entry and exit in which
relatively small ﬁrms are providing relatively
homogeneous goods for a local market. This
allows for net entry to be modeled as an error-
correction process (see also Geroski, 1995). Re-
gions where there are many ﬁrms given consumer
demand are expected to show more exit than
entry (hence, net entry is negative), while regions
in which there are relatively few ﬁrms given
consumer demand are expected to show higher
entry than exit (hence, net entry is positive). We
alsodisentanglethetwocomponentsofnetentry:
gross entry and gross exit, to examine which of
the two contribute most to this error-correction
process. Since we do not compare entry and exit
rates across industries but across local markets
for a speciﬁc industry, entry and exit behavior
may be less inﬂuenced by barriers to entry and
exit and more by market opportunities.
Entry and exit of ﬁrms are important indica-
tors of the economic dynamism of a region. The
importance of new entry for market competition,
eﬃciency and economic development is largely
undisputed. Alfred Marshall (1961) already used
the parable of the young trees of the forest
replacing large and old trees gradually loosing
vitality. Industries with low birth and death rates
are likely to be more vulnerable to an inadequate
allocation of resources, limited innovativeness,
and some form of formal or tacit collusion
(Geroski and Jacquemin, 1985). Therefore, high
barriers to entry and exit may be serious
impediments to dynamic market eﬃciency.
Entrepreneurs may not only be hindered but
sometimes also not aware of proﬁt opportunities
available and, hence, there may be limited com-
petition in the sense of ‘‘the free entry of rivals,
each in an incessant race to better the others’’
(Ikeda, 1990, p.79). The amount of entrepre-
neurial activity may be just too low to quickly
adjust proﬁts to long-run equilibrium levels. For
example, Geroski and Masson (1987) estimate
the speed of the competitive process of excess
proﬁts disappearing over time to be very slow.
Geroski (1995) claims that a slow reaction of
entry to high proﬁts is a stylized fact in the
empirical literature on entry.
The aim of this paper is to extend the work by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and gain insight in
the dynamic (error-correction) process of entry
and exit in retail and consumer service industries
dominated by small ﬁrms. In section 2 we dis-
cuss the entry thresholds and estimate them for
Belgian regional data. In section 3 we consider
the eﬀect of the presence of ‘market room’ on
entry and exit. The speed of adjustment is the
key empirical issue in this section. Section 4
concludes.
2. Entry thresholds from ordered probit analysis
This research deviates from earlier research
using count data, like Asplund and Sandin
(1999), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Dranove
et al. (1992) and Shonkwiler and Harris (1996),
to examine actual local entry and exit rates. The
availability of both entry and exit rates at a local
level and detailed industry level allows this study
to progress upon insights obtained in these
articles. The four articles mentioned estimate
entry thresholds using data on the number of
providers/ﬁrms for one year of observation.
204 Martin Carree and Marcus DejardinAsplund and Sandin consider driving schools in
250 Swedish regional markets, Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) use data for ﬁve retail and profes-
sional service industries (dentists; doctors;
druggists; plumbers; tire dealers) in 202 U.S.
distinct geographic markets, Dranove et al., deal
with specialized hospital services in 87 local
markets in California and Shonkwiller and
Harris concentrate upon outlets in three retail
sectors (building materials and garden supply
stores; clothing and accessory stores; furniture
and home furnishing stores) in 242 rural com-
munities. A theoretical paper by Serra et al.
(1999) deals with the location decision of retail
outlets in an entry threshold model. Bresnahan
and Reiss (1994) did consider net entry data in
their estimation of the diﬀerence between entry
and exit thresholds. They apply a natural
monopoly model to data of dentists who prac-
ticed in 152 U.S. rural counties. Their analysis
did not use actual entry nor exit data but data
on the numbers of ﬁrms in two years (1980 and
1988). Their conslusion that entry and exit
thresholds may diﬀer makes it especially valu-
able to investigate the impact of ‘market room’
on both entry and exit ﬂows.
Number of entries, exits and incumbents are
obtained for all 455 Belgian municipalities
whose local market size (measured by popula-
tion) is less than 20,000 inhabitants (source:
Belgian National Institute of Statistics).
1 We
assume that ﬁrms in the same industry in such
municipalities are competing for the same con-
sumers. The size of the markets is on average
much smaller than used by Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005), who also study narrowly-
deﬁned retail industries but identify metropoli-
tan statistical areas as their separate markets,
and Dranove et al. (1992), who study medical
services provided by hospitals and, hence, con-
sider cities (with an average size of 200,000
inhabitants). However, the sizes used in the
current study are somewhat larger, on average,
than that of the distinct local markets as used in
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and in Shonkwiler
and Harris (1996). The data are derived from
the stock of active taxable ﬁrms and self-em-
ployed (in the value-added-tax books) at the end
of each year, as well as the number of registra-
tions and deletions per year, from 1998 to 2001.
Special attention was paid to select retail and
consumer service industries that are composed
of ﬁrms with similar economic activities (rela-
tively homogeneous products and services). We
opted for an industrial deﬁnition according to
ﬁve-digits NACE-Belgium. The industries are
selected to have their ﬁrms dependent upon local
market conditions and to be commonly present
in local markets (municipalities). That is,
industries with a large majority of municipalities
with zero ﬁrms are left out of consideration. In
addition, we have selected industries that are
only limitedly confronted with competition from
supermarkets and department stores. The fol-
lowing 13 industries (NACE-Belgium code)
were found to fulﬁll these conditions best:
Plumbing (45330), Painting (45441), Butcheries
(52220), Bakeries (52240, 15812; retail sale and
craftsmen of bread and confectionery), Phar-
macies (52310), Clothing (52421–52424), Shoe
stores (52431), Flower shops (52483), Jewelry
(52484), Restaurants (55301), Fast food outlets
(55302), Caterers (55522) and Real estate agen-
cies (70311).
Summary statistics of the number of incum-
bents (in 1998), entrants and exits are presented
in Table I. For entry and exit we provide data
both for 1999 and for the three-year period
1999–2001. The average number of incumbents
per municipality range from 1.64 for jewelry and
2.29 for shoe stores to 9.76 for fast food and
10.18 for restaurants. The average number of
entrants and exits are both lowest for jewelry
and both highest for fast food. Net entry is
positive for ﬁve out of 13 industries (plumbing,
painting, restaurants, caterers, real estate agen-
cies). In none of the retail industries we ﬁnd a
positive net entry. The restaurants show the
strongest growth in number of ﬁrms, with the
butcheries and bakeries displaying the strongest
decline. Industries with relatively high (low)
entry rates also have relatively high (low) exit
rates. This may be a consequence of diﬀerences
in the height of entry barriers across diﬀerent
retail and consumer service industries. The dis-
tribution of municipalities in our sample
according to population size is given in Figure 1.
The entry threshold N 
t in year t (1998) is
computed using an ordered probit analysis since
the threshold only takes integer values (starting
205 Entry Thresholds and Actual Entry and Exit in Local Marketsat 0). The entry threshold is assumed to depend
upon six exogenous variables. These are personal
incomepercapitameasuredin1998(PersInc);the
rateofcommuting,viz.netnumberofcommuters
(commuting ‘in’ minus ‘out’) per capita, accord-
ingtothe1991census(Commute);thepopulation
growthratefrom1990to1998(PopGr);andthree
dummy variables. The dummy variables are: a
Flanders dummy (1 if Flanders; 0, otherwise); a
City dummy for the presence of a city with more
than 20,000 inhabitants less than ten kilometers
away; and a Border dummy (1 if the municipality
TABLE I
Summary statistics: Averages across municipalities
Industry Stock98 Entry99 Exit99 Entry99-01 Exit99-01
Plumbing 9.35 (32) 0.55 (4) 0.49 (4) 1.66 (7) 1.57 (7)
Painting 4.75 (19) 0.30 (4) 0.29 (4) 0.95 (7) 0.89 (6)
Butcheries 6.51 (28) 0.26 (3) 0.43 (5) 0.65 (6) 1.39 (12)
Bakeries 9.42 (67) 0.51 (4) 0.76 (5) 1.52 (7) 2.18 (9)
Pharmacies 4.54 (23) 0.22 (3) 0.23 (4) 0.56 (4) 0.68 (6)
Clothing 5.73 (54) 0.41 (5) 0.49 (6) 1.21 (8) 1.40 (14)
Shoe stores 2.29 (13) 0.13 (2) 0.20 (3) 0.39 (3) 0.59 (6)
Flower shops 4.64 (19) 0.32 (3) 0.34 (3) 0.87 (5) 0.96 (7)
Jewelry 1.64 (10) 0.06 (2) 0.11 (2) 0.18 (3) 0.30 (3)
Restaurants 10.18 (91) 0.91 (9) 0.74 (8) 2.71 (22) 2.24 (20)
Fast food 9.76 (80) 1.13 (6) 1.16 (9) 3.33 (23) 3.33 (25)
Caterers 3.24 (13) 0.28 (3) 0.23 (4) 0.81 (4) 0.71 (6)
Real estate 4.70 (62) 0.40 (5) 0.32 (4) 1.19 (13) 0.96 (9)













0.0 -2.5 2.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 7.5 7.5 -10.0 10.0 -12.5   12.5 - 15.0 15.0 - 17.5 17.5-20.0

























Figure 1. Distribution of municipalities according to population size.
206 Martin Carree and Marcus Dejardinisontheborderofaneighboringforeigncountry;
0, otherwise). In the ordered probit regression
these variables are all multiplied with popula-
tion (Pop) as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991,
p.979).
Population and average personal income are
included as key determinants of market size. We
correct for the rate of commuting since many
commuters may buy goods in the municipality
where they work. We introduce a Flanders dum-
my to correct for potential regional diﬀerences in
tastes, entrepreneurial culture and policy envi-
ronment (Belgium consists of three main regions:
Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia with the latter
two (predominantly) French-speaking). The City
dummy is used to correct for demand eﬀects of
the presence of a large city nearby (eﬀects
described by Reilly’s Law (1931) of retail gravi-
tation). The Border dummy corrects for possible
demand eﬀects of a municipality being on the
border of France, Luxembourg, Germany or the




t ¼ð a0 þ a1PersInct þ a2Commutet
þ a3PopGrt þ a4Flanders þ a5Cityt
þ a6BorderÞ Popt
The number of ﬁrms in a municipality is deter-
mined from N 
t as follows (with M being the
largest number of ﬁrms in a municipality):
Nt=
0 if N 
t   c1
1 if c1<N 




Mi f cM<N 
t
8
> > > <
> > > :
The ordered probit maximum likelihood routine
(Stata 8.0) renders estimates for the parameters
a0 through a6 and the threshold values c1
through cM.
3 The estimates for the parameters
for each of the thirteen industries are presented
in Table II. The ﬁt of the ordered probit model
is relatively constant over the diﬀerent indus-
tries. The average pseudo R
2 for the thirteen
industries is 0.1540. It ranges for a minimum of
0.1025 for caterers to a maximum of 0.2058 for
bakeries.
The eﬀect of personal income is signiﬁcant for
eight industries. Five times a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect is found: for plumbing, pharmacies,
clothing, restaurants and real estate.
4 It is sig-
niﬁcantly negative for butcheries, bakeries and
fast food. The ﬁrst two industries have suﬀered
from hypermarkets introduced in the areas with
most buying power. One can juxtapose the
negative eﬀect for fast food to the positive eﬀect
for restaurants (serving traditional food). Fast
food is a relatively cheap way of eating out. The
eﬀect of the rate of commuting is signiﬁcant for
seven industries, the majority of which positive.
A positive eﬀect is as expected since a positive
net rate of commuting implies increased buying
power. The eﬀect of population growth (in the
previous periods) is signiﬁcant for eight indus-
tries. It is negative for butcheries, bakeries and
ﬂower shops. Cities in which population declines
or is stagnant are likely to have a relatively high
percentage of elderly. These are probably more
likely to buy in the traditional butcheries and
bakeries. The eﬀect of population growth is very
strong for the fast food and real estate indus-
tries. These industries proﬁt probably from a
relatively young population. The Flanders
dummy is signiﬁcant for eight industries and
only one is negative (pharmacies). The positive
eﬀect found in many industries could for
example be due to Flemish families having more
ﬁnancial means next to personal income or to
Flanders having a more developed entrepre-
neurial culture. The City dummy is eight times
signiﬁcant and only for plumbing there is a po-
sitive eﬀect. Hence, in general, shops in small
municipalities suﬀer from the presence of larger
cities nearby. The Border dummy is only sig-
niﬁcant for four industries and all of these ef-
fects are negative.
3. Entry and exit adjusting for disequilibrium
For each of the industries in Table II we com-
puted the predicted number of ﬁrms in a munic-
ipality (in 1998), ^ Nt. This is used to compute the
marketdisequilibrium:thediﬀerencebetweenthe
predicted and actual number of ﬁrms, ^ Nt   Nt.A
positive diﬀerence indicates ‘market room’ for
new entry (an unsaturated market), while a
negative diﬀerence indicates lack of ‘market
room’ (a crowded market). Entrepreneurs who
are alert to proﬁt opportunities are more likely to

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































208 Martin Carree and Marcus Dejardinenter local markets with considerable ‘market
room’ when compared to more saturated mar-
kets. Entrepreneurs in crowded local markets
(who make losses) are more likely to leave than
entrepreneurs in unsaturated markets, maybe to
enter other more promising local markets.
Hence, we expect that local markets in which the
predicted number of ﬁrms exceeds the actual
number to show higher entry rates, lower exit
rates and, consequently, higher net entry rates
than local markets in which the actual number
exceeds the predicted number.
In Table III we test this by means of
regressions of the number of entrants in period
t, Et, the number of exiting ﬁrms in period t,
Xt, and the diﬀerence (net entry), Et–Xt,
on the preceding ‘market room’ variable
^ Nt 1   Nt 1 and on the preceding stock of
ﬁrms Nt–1.
5 We choose for regression analysis
since net entry can be negative and to allow
for comparison of gross entry, gross exit and
net entry results. In Table IV we show nega-
tive binomial estimation results for gross entry
and gross exit. Results are similar, although in
Table IV there are more signiﬁcant eﬀects than
in Table III. Our discussion is based upon the
results in Table III. The period t)1 is always
1998. The results for period t are given for
1999 (one-year reaction) and 1999–2001 (three-
year reaction).
The results clearly indicate that entry is in-
deed positively aﬀected by ‘market room’. Nine
out of 13 industries have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect and none of the industries have a negative
eﬀect in case the year 1999 is chosen. In case the
three-year period 1999–2001 is chosen, all thir-
teen industries show a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
The results for exit are quite diﬀerent. For the
TABLE III
Regression results for entry, exit and net entry adjusting for disequilibrium






























































































































































2 0.139 0.203 0.036 0.267 0.415 0.081
Note: ***, ** and * mean signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. Ent99 is entry in 1999; Exit99 is
exit in 1999; NE99 is net entry in 1999; Ent9901 is entry in the years 1999–2001; Exit9901 is exit in the years 1999–2001;
NE9901 is net entry in the years 1999–2001.
209 Entry Thresholds and Actual Entry and Exit in Local Marketsyear 1999 there are only two industries showing
a signiﬁcant eﬀect, one positive (Restaurants)
and only one the expected negative eﬀect
(Butcheries). For the years 1999–2001 there are
ﬁve industries with a signiﬁcant eﬀect, but each
of them positive. However, the results for entry
are stronger than those found for exit, resulting
in most industries to have a positive eﬀect for
net entry. The one exception is Bakeries.
6 Note
that the R-squared is on average relatively low
for net entry (8%) in case of a three-year period.
It indicates that a simple error-correction
framework is not able to explain the variety in
the net entry rates across regions very well. The
explanatory power of the error-correction model
for gross entry is substantially higher on average
(27%).
The results suggest that net entry indeed ad-
justs for disequilibrium. For four industries
(Painting, Pharmacies, Flowers, Caterers) this
adjustment is more than 10% for a three-year
period.
7 However, for other industries this
adjustment is more modest. The results also
indicate that the adjustment for disequilibrium
mainly takes places through diﬀerences in entry
rates between municipalities.
8 This suggests that
when the actual number of ﬁrms is higher than
the available ‘market room’, a negative net entry
rate is caused by a lower entry rate rather than
by a higher exit rate. Exit being aﬀected to a
lesser extent by proﬁt opportunities than entry is
a general ﬁnding in the empirical industrial
organization literature (Carree and Thurik,
1996). Location-speciﬁc sunk costs causing exit
thresholds to be lower than entry thresholds
may be a reason for this. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1994), for example, ﬁnd that a dentist will set
up a monopoly practice in a town of 1,400 or
TABLE IV
Negative binomial results for entry and exit adjusting for disequilibrium










































































































2 0.069 0.093 0.081 0.129
Note: ***, ** and * mean signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. Standard errors between
brackets. Ent99 is entry in 1999; Exit99 is exit in 1999; Ent9901 is entry in the years 1999–2001; Exit9901 is exit in the years
1999–2001.
210 Martin Carree and Marcus Dejardinmore residents, while a monopoly incumbent
dentist will stay until a town has less than 800
residents.
4. Conclusion
The current study shows how the Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) cross-sectional framework can be
extended to a dynamic framework. We derive a
relationship between local market size and
number of ﬁrms for thirteen diﬀerent Belgian
retail and service industries (in 1998) using or-
dered probit analysis. We investigate whether
markets that have higher (lower) actual than
predicted numbers of ﬁrms show exit (entry) in
subsequent periods of one and three years. The
results conﬁrm that over a three-year period the
rate of (net) entry is positively aﬀected by the
presence of ‘market room’. The exit rate, how-
ever, does not show a negative relation with
‘market room’. This indicates that changes in
entry rates are a more likely source of adjusting
for market disequilibria than changes in exit
rates. The speed of adjustment is relatively low
for most industries, however.
Although the rate of entry and net entry can
to a certain extent be explained from an estimate
of whether a local market is crowded or unsat-
urated, it has also become clear that much var-
iance is left unexplained for. There are several
possible reasons for this, but apparently entre-
preneurs in their decision to start a retail or
consumer service venture are only limitedly
inﬂuenced by whether a market is saturated or
not (as measured in the current study). It indi-
cates that the choice to enter or not is based
more upon their (assumed) individual entrepre-
neurial qualities and/or circumstances and less
on market opportunities. This suggests that the
inter-temporal dynamics of entry and exit in
regions would be a promising route for future
research.
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Notes
1 One municipality, Herstappe, with a population of less
than 100 inhabitants, was left out from the analyses.
2 Shonkwiler and Harris (1996) argue that there may be
interdependence in the number of ﬁrms in diﬀerent retail
industries. This would indicate a multivariate count-data
procedure which is, however, infeasible in case of thirteen
industries.
3 The threshold values may be overestimated in case of
relatively new industries that have only recently begun to
gain legitimacy. This would lead to an underestimation of
the ‘market room’ present. This is not a problem in the
current study since all industries are well-established.
4 The jewelry industry does not have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect. This surprising outcome may be the result of most
consumersbuyingjewelriesinanearbycity.Thisisconﬁrmed
by the eﬀects of the rate of commuting and the City dummy.
5 We do not report the coeﬃcients for the eﬀect of the
stock of ﬁrms in the previous period to save space.
6 The unexpected eﬀect of market disequilibrium for
Bakeries led us to a further investigation of this industry.
An oﬃcial of the Belgian Confederation of the Bakery,
Pastry, Chocolate and Ice-Cream industry suggested that
the growing number of bakeries selling their products
through multiple locations – breaking the traditional one
producer - one selling point relationship could account for
this. This type of restructuring was taking place mostly in
cities. We have tested the assumption that the eﬀect of
market room on net entry was dependent upon municipality
population size. We found indeed that the negative eﬀect is
strongest for the municipalities with most inhabitants in our
sample.
7 This rate of adjustment is likely to be an overestima-
tion of the actual impact of entry and exit in the local
markets. It has been reported that the entrant and exit
relative size is only about half of that of the incumbents in
U.S. retailing (Jarmin et al., 2003, Table II) and in Dutch
retailing and hospitality industries (Audretsch et al., 1999,
Table 10.2).
8 This conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings in Carree and Thurik
(1999).
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